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1. KEY FINDINGS  
This paper investigates the dimensions of time and effort and how these factors 
impact on the venture creation process in Australia. Findings of interest in this paper 
include: 
• First and foremost business planning is used as a thinking tool within the boundaries 
of the firm. 
• Business planning is more strongly associated with firms that are more ambitious, 
being built by teams, draw on more experience or education. 
• Industry characteristics in part drive the duration required for venture creation. 
Manufacturing and Agriculture based firms seemingly take longer timeframes than 
other industries. Extended venture creation times frames are also associated with 
firms that aim to bring more novel concepts to market. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This paper takes a different approach to earlier papers. Rather than illustrate what 
new ventures are like, it describes what entrepreneurs do when they create them. This 
venture creation process is a complex phenomenon which can vary widely in the time and 
effort required, and in the importance of the different steps taken along the way. We 
unpack this by focusing on two important dimensions – time and action. In addition, the 
paper explores the use of business planning in entrepreneurial firms. We will provide 
Australian empirical evidence for emerging start-ups, using data from the Comprehensive 
Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE). This longitudinal data set, which 
was collected in four annual waves 2007-11, uniquely allows the analysis of entrants at two 
stages of development. These are the random samples of Nascent firms (625 cases) – which 
are in the process of being created but not yet established in the market place – and Young 
firms (559 cases). In keeping with the venture creation theme of this paper we focus on the 
Nascent Firm data exclusively, Young Firm data is only used to illustrate the prevalence of 
business planning. The data is further explained in the Appendix. For more comprehensive 
accounts of the CAUSEE data collection, please refer to Davidsson, Steffens, and Gordon 
(2011) and/or the CAUSEE User Manual (Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, 
2012). 
Prior research studies that are most useful in analysing the venture creation 
process tend to examine multiple dimensions of the process (such as time, and the number 
of actions taken) or focus on multiple events that describe a particular type of action. What 
is meant by time in this instance is the duration, pace and rhythm at which venture creation 
occurs, whereas action refers to the behaviours the entrepreneur engage in to build their 
business. The paper starts with a review of prior research on the venture creation process, 
and proceeds to examine a number of different aspects of that process. The paper begins 
with a stock take of business planning prevalence, secondly focuses on the time in the 
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venture creation process, and finally is followed by an assessment of the action that fills 
venture creation. The paper concludes by analysing time and action to examine dynamic 
properties of the venture creation process such as the rate and the sequence order of 
actions. 
3. PRIOR FINDINGS ON PLANNING AND THE VENTURE CREATION PROCESS 
Prior research studies of venture creation have analysed many different individual 
actions (Reynolds, 1997; Parker, 2011), such as engaging an accountant or an lawyer, 
producing financial statements (Cassar, 2009), or gaining funding. In many cases this 
research does nothing more than describe the start-up process, and the proportion of 
ventures that take a particular action. For example, business planning has been extensively 
studied yet despite the potential for knowledge aggregation, little apparent consensus exists 
(Delmar & Shane, 2004; Honig & Karlsson, 2004; Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007). In fact the 
existence of a business plan at all has been attributed to normative pressures to produce 
one (Honig & Karlsson, 2004). In turn, for pre-operational ventures the plan does not seem 
to confer any tangible benefit on the future performance of the venture, in terms of 
profitability (Honig & Samuelsson, 2012). What effect has been found suggests venture 
continuance rather than more successful outcomes (Davidsson & Gordon, 2012). At best, 
those ventures that had engaged in planning activities were more active in their venture 
creation attempts (Delmar & Shane, 2003; Delmar & Shane, 2004). However, despite the 
ubiquity of business planning in business school teaching, it is but one thing a venture may 
do on the way to establishment, and beyond the nascent stage it may be beneficial 
(Brinckmann, Grichnik, & Kapsa, in press). Should there not be too much time devoted to it, 
then business planning can do little to harm the progress of venture creation. 
3.1 Time 
With regard to the venture creation process and the time dimension alone: Most 
work on time in the venture creation process set about describing how long a venture takes 
to be created. The short answer to this question is – it depends (Reynolds & Miller, 1992). 
The length of time a process takes depends on a number of variables like the type of 
venture (Newbert, 2005; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Samuelsson & Davidsson, 2009), and the 
effort expended. The process can be anything from a few months to over a decade 
(Reynolds & Miller, 1992). Purely descriptive results suggest that, while technology based 
start-ups have a longer and more active process, theirs is not necessarily engaged any 
quicker (Liao & Welsch, 2008). Some have found females tend to have a slower rate of 
venture creation action (Alsos & Ljunggren, 1998) while others find little difference by 
gender (Menzies, Diochon, Gasse, & Elgie, 2006). Entrepreneurs that run more than one 
business have been identified as having slower process (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998), 
presumably as their attention is diverted between numerous alternatives. 
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3.2 Action 
With regard to action alone: The extant research has identified a number of 
antecedents to increased action in the venture creation process. For example, the 
technological sophistication of the venture is a driver of action (Liao & Welsch, 2008). High 
technology ventures do more to plan, do more to establish legitimacy, do more to engage in 
the market, do more to combine resources. Other drivers of increased action are human 
capital (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Samuelsson & Davidsson, 2009) 
and social capital (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Patel & Fiet, 2009; Samuelsson & Davidsson, 
2009). Of these antecedents to venture creation action, social and human capital seem to 
have the most consistent empirical support. Therefore this paper will examine these effects 
by comparing experienced and more educated entrepreneurs to those who possess less 
human capital, as well as contrasting solo and team based ventures. 
3.3 Venture Creation Sequencing  
When action and time are combined: further patterns in the venture creation 
process may be revealed. To this end, some authors have suggested that slow organisation 
of the venture offers an advantage (Brush, Manolova, & Edelman, 2008), while others find 
that increasing the action rate is beneficial (Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, & Gartner, 2007). 
The more persuasive evidence, however, suggests that fast is better. Rather than look at 
how long a venture takes to successfully become operational much research examines how 
long venture attempts persist (i.e. are not abandoned). In this respect – planning (Shane & 
Delmar, 2004) and legitimisation1 (Delmar & Shane, 2004) actions assist the venture to 
remain ongoing. However, it is not clear whether failure to terminate an ineffectual venture 
is necessarily a good thing. 
The order in which the venture creation plays out is the least studied aspect of the 
process. Liao, Welsch, and Tan (2005) suggest that the venture creation process sequence is 
extremely complex, and that multiple pathways toward outcomes exist. This suggests that 
identifying particular (stand out) sequences may be a difficult task. It seems that the main 
‘take away’ from research on venture creation sequencing is that, there is no single one, 
common to all ventures. Although, prior research has found that few differences exist 
between the sequence of actions taken by novice entrepreneurs when compared with those 
taken by experienced entrepreneurs (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998). Other research suggests that 
ventures will follow a particular venture creation sequence depending on their technological 
sophistication (Liao & Welsch, 2008). However, no support for this effect has been found.  
It seems that early planning (Liao & Gartner, 2007; Dimov, 2010) prior to other 
actions, such as engaging in marketing and customer discussions (Shane & Delmar, 2004), 
has a beneficial effect on venture continuation. However, the effect of plan timing depends 
on the competitive environment (Liao & Gartner, 2007), and does not ensure any benefit 
                                                     
1 Legitimising actions are those that result in acknowledge by others of presence and valid purpose of the venture, such as opening a bank 
account, registering with the government, purchasing liability insurance. 
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beyond venture persistence. In other words, there is little evidence of the effect of planning 
on venture success (Davidsson & Gordon, 2012), regardless of its place in sequence of the 
process. Therefore, in addition to there not being a common sequence followed by all 
ventures, it seems there is no specific sequence of venture creation that consistently drives 
venture success. 
4. VENTURE CREATION PLANNING 
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of business planning activity in Nascent and Young 
Firms broken down by industry and entrepreneurial experience. A number of findings 
emerge from this analysis. Overall, business plans more often than not (66 per cent) are 
created by entrepreneurial firms at some stage of their development. The CAUSEE data 
reveals that this is more likely to be during the pre-operational nascent phase (75 per cent) 
than later as Young Firms (57 per cent). Firms in the Construction industry are less likely to 
have written a business plan than other industries, while for the Consumer Services industry 
the opposite is true. The data also shows that while Nascent Firms plan more, and this is 
ubiquitous across many sub-groups of venture type (like product versus service based 
firms). 
Figure 1. 
 
Rather more interesting patterns are evident when examining Young Firm business 
planning behaviours. For Young Firms, those that are team based, have founders with prior 
experience of entrepreneurship or are based on product (rather than service) offerings are 
significantly more likely to have written a business plan (Figure 1 right). However, should the 
founding team contain an owner that holds a university degree, they are more likely to 
possess a business plan, regardless of whether they are a Nascent or Young Firm. A valid 
assumption regarding the association between university education and business planning is 
that business planning is the type of thing that university business schools teach (Edelman, 
Manolova, & Brush, 2008). Or indeed, that firms founded by university educated founder 
teams are more likely to create ventures that have a particular use for a business plan, such 
as seeking outside funding. However this latter conjecture is not supported by the data as 
university educated firms assign the same importance to different business plan uses as do 
others. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the presence of business plans develops over time in Nascent 
and Young Firms. Figure 2 (left) focuses on the difference in plan prevalence for team 
ventures as compared to solo efforts. Firstly, this underscores the increased rate of planning 
found in Nascent Firms (compared with Young Firms). Secondly, it highlights that team 
based ventures are also more likely to engage in business planning. What is most interesting 
however is that over time solo based young firms are likely to approach team planning 
rates, while for Nascent Firms this rate diverges over time. 
Comparing the prevalence of business planning over time by gender also reveals an 
interesting finding (Figure 2 right). For Nascent Firms the likelihood of business planning 
increases over time at a similar rate regardless of the firms gender composition. In Young 
Firms the rate of business planning for female owned ventures increases markedly over 
time, compared with mixed gender or all male owned firms. In fact, later in the venture 
creation process female young firms are more likely than male young firms to have engaged 
in business planning. 
Yet the data tell us little of what a business plan is for. Of course, business plans can 
serve different purposes. On the one hand they may be used as tool inside the firm to 
coordinate their activities, or they may be focused on others outside the venture to 
communicate the firm’s vision and goals. The CAUSEE study captures this type of 
information from those founders who engage in business planning. Figure 3 shows how the 
business plan is used by Nascent and Young Firms, and in what form that plan exists. 
However, the form and function of the business plan is not static so Figure 3 also displays 
how business plan use and business plan form changes as the venture progresses. 
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Figure 3. 
 
One thing that does seem to remain fairly constant when it comes to business 
planning is the importance accorded to different uses. In fact, the order of importance 
rating attributed business plan usage is consistent across many sub-group comparisons. 
Having the business plan act as a vehicle for accessing finance is clearly and consistently the 
least important plan use made by both Nascent and Young Firm teams. The other consistent 
pattern is that the most important use for the business plan is as a thinking tool within the 
venture. Between these two extremes the business plan may be used as either a 
communication tool or as an action plan for the venture. This order of importance also holds 
over time as the venture progresses and with minimal variation. The use of the business 
plan as an action plan is of particular relevance for Nascent Firms as it may serve as a 
blueprint for how they proceed during the venture creation process. 
A business plan may also exist in a number of forms. A common view of the 
business plan is a formally written document that details the strategic position of the 
company, the value proposition offered, its technology and resources, the goals it aims to 
achieve as well as financial and other projections into the future should these goals be 
achieved. This corresponds with the type of business plan typically taught to students in 
MBA or other university business classes. Yet, a business plan need not take written form 
but be captured by the entrepreneurial teams’ understanding of where their business is 
headed. The business plan form could also fall somewhere in between the ‘on paper’ and ‘in 
head’ versions, and exist as a less formal plan or set of plans captured as notes. For those 
firms that do have a business plan, the CAUSEE study collected information on what form it 
is in: formal, informal, unwritten (Figure 3 left). A clear pattern in this data is that business 
plan form drifts away from formal versions over time, rather than plan formality being an 
increasing pressure felt as the venture proceeds. Again, comparing sub groups tells us more 
about the form that business plans take. In the case of team based firms, a business plan is 
far more likely to exist as a formal document, than is the case for a solo entrepreneur’s 
venture. This may suggest that in teams the business plan is used as a communication tool 
between owners, but the data do not support this. Rather, what may explain this increased 
plan formality in team ventures is the type of firm they aspire to be. 
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Although the business plan can reveal some information about the type of venture 
creation being attempted, and its presence may (or may not) improve a firm’s chances of 
success, it does little to inform us about what else happens in the venture creation process, 
even if it does inform the steps entrepreneur plans to take. The remainder of this paper 
turns to data on Nascent Firms only, and details the time and effort devoted to business 
creation, and the level of action engaged in along the way, by analysing data on what 
entrepreneurs do in the process. 
5. VENTURE CREATION TIME AND EFFORT 
In order to evaluate the venture creation process it is necessary to define where it 
begins and where it ends. This is not an easy task, as there are many, and to some extent 
equally valid, answers to this question. For example venture creation may be considered to 
begin with the aspirations a person holds to one day start their own business, or indeed 
with a developed business plan. However, this type of ‘aspiration’ is something that is 
difficult to measure a beginning for. Indeed it is a more general goal that may have different 
manifestations depending on the circumstance, and aspirations alone do not ensure that 
actions are taken. In this analysis of the venture creation, it is assumed that the process 
begins with some concrete action or observable behaviour directed at building a new 
business. This may be conceiving the idea for a business and then writing a business plan (as 
above), or it may be discussing the business with potential customers you one day hope to 
serve. For the purposes of capturing the venture creation process the CAUSEE study 
collected information on the completion and timing of over 30 possible business creation 
actions. The measure we adopt for when the venture creation process starts is the time 
when one of these actions is first completed. 
As for the end of the process, a number of choices could also be made, for 
example, venture creation’s end point could be when a firm hires its first employee, or 
when it first registers with some regulatory body. Yet, CAUSEE adopts a market based 
measure of venture creation. The definition we use is that should the Nascent Firm make 
regular sales in the market (for at least 6 of the past 12 months) then they could be 
considered an operational firm. Beyond this point the development of the firm becomes 
more and more an interaction between firm behaviour and the market, rather than a 
process which strives to create that market in the first place. Therefore at this point the 
venture ‘creation’ process may be considered complete, and this is the definition we adopt. 
So the time taken to create a new firm is from when their first action is taken, up until they 
engage in consistent market activity. 
5.1 Time 
The first thing to note from the analysis of venture creation time is that Nascent 
Firm creation attempts take longer to conclude than might be first thought. Counting the 
time from when a new venture is first acted upon (including first being thought about), over 
all industries, the average is 5 years to become operational (61 months) and attempts that 
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are eventually abandoned take 6 years on average until they are last worked upon. 
However, the differences in duration depending on the attempt outcome do not hold up to 
statistical testing. Overall, there is no clear indication that operational attempts reach this 
state quicker than it takes a firm to be abandoned. So the mere passage of time cannot be 
taken as a signal of the success in the venture creation process. 
Figure 4. 
 
It stands to reason that it might take longer to create a venture in some industries 
compared with others. Figure 42 shows the time in months taken for venture creation within 
each the seven most common industries captured in the CAUSEE study. The duration of 
each venture creation attempt is further broken down by the venture creation outcome 
achieved: whether it reaches an operational state, abandons the venture or remaining 
ongoing in the process (at last contact with the CAUSEE study). When the industry is taken 
into account, some patterns start to emerge from the data. 
Two industries in particular have timeframes that diverge from the norm, 
Manufacturing and Agriculture (Figure 4). In the Agriculture industry it takes longer for firms 
to become operational, and accordingly venture creation attempts remain in the ‘still trying’ 
stage for far longer than in other industries. In Manufacturing, surprisingly, there is no 
difference in how long it takes for venture to become operational. However, there is a 
marked difference in how long ventures are persisted with before being abandoned (Figure 
                                                     
2 The results are reported through “boxplots”. This type of diagram gives a better representation of group differences than do simple 
comparisons of means. While the latter may erroneously give the impression that “all the members of category X are like this, while all the 
members of category Y are like that” the boxplot displays both the central tendency and the dispersion within groups, thus highlighting 
the high degree of overlap across groups that may be present even when there is a “statistically significant” mean difference. The plot also 
reveals any (differential) skewness in the distributions, as it partitions these into four parts where each part represents 25 per cent of the 
cases. The shaded area in the boxplot shows where the middle 50 per cent of the sub-sample are found. This middle group is divided into 
two equal parts by the median, depicted by the line in the shaded area. The bottom 25 per cent have values between the bottom of the 
shaded area and the lower crossbar. Similarly, the vertical line from the shaded area to the top crossbar shows the range of values for the 
top 25 per cent of the cases. However, the maximum (minimum) level for the top (bottom) crossbar is set at a value corresponding to 
adding 1.5 times the height of the shaded box on top (at the bottom) of that box. This means that occasionally a few extreme cases are 
excluded from the graphical representation. 
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5 right). Four in five Manufacturing start-up attempts had been in progress for over five 
years before eventually being abandoned, the others were terminated rather more quickly. 
In the case of Agriculture (Figure 5 left) the majority of firms take more than five years to 
become operational and none less than half a year. 
Figure 5. 
 
Comparing factors other than the industry environment reveals additional 
determinants of venture creation process duration. Venture creation attempts undertaken 
by those that have all Female owners, of which mostly (87 per cent) are solo attempts, have 
shorter time-frames than those of all male and mixed gender teams. There are good reasons 
for this difference. Despite there being no discernible difference in the venture creation 
time-frames for Retail, Consumer Services, Health Social and Education industries by 
themselves, they all exhibit shorter (though not statistically significant) than average 
durations regardless of attempt outcome. Further, female owned ventures are over-
represented in these three industries. Therefore, in aggregate there is a gender effect on 
venture creation duration, given its interaction with industry choice (Figure 6 left). 
Figure 6. 
  
The idea that having prior experience of entrepreneurship should allow you to build 
your business quicker than those that do not have this experience is not supported by the 
data. In fact the opposite seems to be true – those that have prior experience tend to take 
(marginally) longer to establish their ventures, as they also hold on to them for longer prior 
to termination of their attempts. The most certain of these findings is that experienced 
entrepreneurs take more time to terminate. This suggests that experienced entrepreneurs 
exhibit a level of tenacity, or perseverance to make their venture work, and will accordingly 
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spend more time with it before eventually abandoning it. Another difference in the time it 
takes for venture creation can be linked to the level of novelty in the venture. Put simply it 
takes firms that are based around newer ideas or processes longer to establish themselves. 
This is presumably because they have to prove themselves to the owners that develop them 
and the wider market they aim to establish. 
5.2 Effort 
Some confirmation for the tenacity experienced entrepreneurs exert is given when 
the analysis focuses on the time invested in the business start-up rather than the overall 
time it takes. In this case, entrepreneurs with prior experience will invest more hours over 
all in their venture. For experienced entrepreneurs this investment of time increases at a 
greater rate as the venture progress compared with other founders (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. 
 
Other sub-groups of Nascent Firm also display differences in the hours applied to 
venture creation. New ventures started by university educated founders demand more time 
and new ventures started by teams (rather than solo entrepreneurs) can have more time 
spent on them. The latter fact will in part be due to the increased size of ownership team 
allows more time in total to be sunk into the developing firm. Gender also seems to play a 
role in the time devoted to venture creation. Those firms founded by all female teams tend 
to have less hours of work spent on them than do all male or mixed gender founding teams 
(Figure 8 left & right). However over time this difference can be attributed to mixed gender 
teams investing more time than both male, and female based firms. (Figure 8 right). As the 
venture creation process plays out, the differences between all male and all female firms in 
terms of effort applied tends to fall away. 
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Figure 8. 
  
5.2.1 Part-time efforts, parallel venturing and team changes 
The preceding analysis highlights that the level of effort devoted to the nascent 
venture is an important factor in the venture creation process and its duration. The analyses 
that follow examine some venture characteristics that determine 1) the effort available to 
be applied and 2) the effect the duration of the process. 
The usual picture of business ownership and indeed the establishment of a brand 
new business is that it is a full-time task, and all of one’s energy needs to be devoted to it in 
order to guarantee success. Yet the data from the CAUSEE study do not confirm this 
armchair impression of business ownership, at least at the earliest Nascent Firm stage of 
development. In fact, full-time founders are in the minority, although a sizeable one. This 
preference for part-time entry is mirrored in US data on nascent entrepreneurship (Petrova, 
2010). Upon recruitment into the study some 38 per cent of Nascent Firm owners had 
devoted to this venture creation effort full-time, by spending 38 hours or more per week on 
it. Four years later the proportion of Nascent Firms who had full-time owners had grown to 
50 per cent. 
Of course there are good reasons for this level of initial commitment. For one, 
despite single person ventures being in the (slight) majority, the Nascent Firm does not 
define the Nascent Entrepreneur—they are separate entities. At first a Nascent Firm may be 
considered an experiment, where the entrepreneur tests the market acceptance for their 
business idea (Sarasvathy, 2001). Concurrent –with their new venture creation attempt, the 
founders may hold down ‘regular work’ from which they derive a living. While there may be 
a fine balance between devoting enough effort to ensure success and not over-committing 
to what may not turn out to be successful. Taking this approach it may be useful to run 
many experiments at once, in order to be able to pick the one that works best. This 
phenomenon of portfolio business ownership is well recognised in the entrepreneurship 
literature (Ucbasaran, Alsos, Westhead, & Wright, 2008). Accordingly, the following analyses 
present CAUSEE data regarding part-time and multiple business ownership.  
In terms of full-time participation in venture creation all male (54 per cent) and 
mixed-gender (57 per cent) venture teams are over-represented (Figure 9 left), while full-
time female owned ventures are in the minority (38 per cent). Females (17 per cent) are 
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also far less likely to be engaged in multiple businesses at the same time compared to all 
male (38 per cent) and mixed gender (43 per cent) firms. Ucbasaran and colleagues (2008) 
reviewed several studies of habitual entrepreneurship behaviour and identified rates of 
multiple venture ownership from 12 per cent through to 40 per cent. This suggests that the 
prevalence of parallel business ownership in the CAUSEE study is rather high. Multiple 
business ownership is also associated with those founder teams that include at least one 
person with a university degree, as it is associated with product based firms, compared to 
service firms. This suggests that parallel venturing is attempted by more sophisticated 
venture teams.  
Figure 9. 
 
Breaking down the rates of full-time and parallel entrepreneurship by major 
industry groups reveals some interesting findings (Figure 9 right). Nascent Firms in 
Agriculture are three times more likely to be engaged in full-time (75 per cent) than part-
time. Founders of Consumer Services firms are most likely to concentrate on that business 
alone, having the lowest rate of multiple-firm ownership (20 per cent). The founders of 
Nascent Firms in the Manufacturing industry have the highest rate of multiple venture 
ownership (44 per cent), yet the lowest rate of full-time commitment (36 per cent). In some 
respects this makes perfect sense, that if the Manufacturing entrepreneurs are more likely 
to be running more than one business, they are less able to commit to any one ‘full-time’. 
This finding goes some way to explaining the pattern of long venture creation durations 
found in Manufacturing, given the multiple demands on the founder’s effort. This is on top 
of any higher level venture creation demands inherent in a manufacturing based venture 
compared with some other industries. 
5.3 Ownership  and Experience  
The CAUSEE data also highlights that founders who have prior experience of 
entrepreneurship are less likely to remain merely ‘part-time’ involved in their new start-up, 
with 45 per cent choosing to do so. Therefore the serial founder exhibits an increased level 
of commitment to entrepreneurship as a career choice by attempting venture creation 
multiple times, and by devoting full-time to their current venture. Further, those with prior 
entrepreneurship experience are more likely to engage in multiple businesses at any one 
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time (53 per cent). The flip-side to this finding is that those who attempt venture creation 
for the first time do so by concentrating on that firm alone.  
Changing ownership team during venture creation will likely affect the progress and 
duration of that process. However CAUSEE data reveals that ownership changes are quite a 
rare event. Over the four years of the study only 7 per cent of start-up attempts had cause 
to either remove (5 per cent) or add new owners (4 per cent) to the Nascent Firm. Despite 
the small number of occurrences captured in the data, there are some discernible 
associations between team change decisions and other venture characteristics. On the 
whole, all female founding teams (2 per cent) are far less likely to change owners than male 
(9 per cent) or mixed gender (11 per cent) teams. In particular, female owned firms are less 
likely to bring on board new owners, compared with their male and mixed-gender 
counterparts. The removal of an owner from the team is more likely in Nascent Firms 
established by those with prior entrepreneurial experience (6 per cent: Figure 10 left), and 
marginally more likely for those teams that have at least one university qualified owner (7 
per cent). As reported above, the sub-group with the highest prevalence of venture 
ownership change are those comprised by mixed gender teams. More often than not this 
team change is the removal of a team member. Given that almost one third of venture 
teams (30 per cent) are formed by spouse teams, it follows that in part this may be due to 
the nature of the spousal relationship (Figure 10 right). 
 
Figure 10. 
 
6. VENTURE CREATION ACTION 
The preceding sections of this paper have examined the venture creation process 
by looking at 1) how it is envisaged through planning, if at all; 2) how it extends though time 
and the amount of effort or ‘sweat equity’ devoted to it; and 3) a number of factors that 
may alter its duration. Yet, none of these factors of themselves describe how a venture goes 
from an idea to a newly formed business that is active and trading in the market. The only 
way for a venture to progress to this level is through explicit actions by the entrepreneur 
aimed to do so. In other words, a new venture is only formed if the entrepreneur does 
something about it, and derives active results from the hours they invest. They must take 
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action. Reflecting the significance of this notion the remainder of this paper is devoted to 
examining the specific actions entrepreneurs take during venture creation. 
The CAUSEE study devotes a large portion of its questionnaire to the actions that 
entrepreneurs take during venture creation, as do counterpart studies of nascent 
entrepreneurship (Reynolds, 2007; Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). This captures what actions a 
Nascent Firm takes as it attempts to become operational, as well as when these actions take 
place. ‘What’ and ‘when’ are both fundamental dimensions for describing action and in turn, 
the venture creation process. 
These actions are “precursor behaviours that entrepreneurs commonly undertake 
to establish a new business” (Carter, Gartner, & Reynolds, 1996: 155). Not all ventures will 
engage in all actions, but, a venture attempt could not be (realistically) considered viable 
should it not engage any of these actions. These actions include things like ‘business idea 
generation’, creating ‘financial projections’, and preparing a ‘business plan’; as well as more 
definitive actions such as ‘hiring employees’, ‘investing money’, and ‘purchasing materials’. 
A summary of these actions is found later in Table 1 or Table 2. The resulting level of ‘action’ 
for each venture attempt is the sum of all of the discrete actions that had been completed 
along the way. 
The five least common actions (less than 25 per cent of firms complete) are: Hire a 
lawyer (23 per cent), hire an employee (22 per cent), develop proprietary technology (20 
per cent), apply for IP protection (14 per cent), and join a business network (14 per cent). 
These are all things that are more often done by teams & experienced entrepreneurs. The 
five most common actions (more than 85 per cent of firms complete) are: invest own money 
(97 per cent), begin product development (93 per cent); establish business location (92 per 
cent, note this can include the home); have customer discussions (89 per cent); and make 
the business contactable (86 per cent). 
Overall, venture creation attempts that are undertaken by team based ventures; 
those that draw on the prior entrepreneurial experience of their founders, or have a 
university qualified owner are all more likely to display an increased level of activity. The 
presumption here is that they are able to draw more readily on the human and social capital 
resources in order to be more active, or are driven to engage in higher potential attempts 
that require more active participation than is the norm. Alternately, those Nascent Firms 
attempted by female owners are less likely to complete a higher level of action during their 
process. 
Figure 11 shows the range of the total number of actions completed during venture 
creation broken down by the major industries in the CAUSEE study. This figure compares the 
actions completed at recruitment (W1) to the total completed three years later (W4). In 
each case there is a significant increase in actions completed. This confirms that action 
indeed facilitates progression in the venture creation process. At W1 the average number of 
venture creation actions that had been completed by Nascent Firms was 18 and over the 
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course of three years this average had increased to 28 actions. Further, there was little 
difference in the totals between industry venture creation actions upon entry into the 
CAUSEE study. The Agriculture industry had marginally more active firms at W1, but by W4 
this difference was not evident. On the other hand, Manufacturing firms at W1 were little 
different from others in the sample, but by W4 were likely to have completed less venture 
creation activities (Figure 12 left).  
Figure 11. 
 
 
Examining the progress of venture creation actions made over time also reveals 
some sub-group differences (Figure 12). While the overall data shows that female owned 
Nascent Firms are less active in total, they are markedly so earlier on, yet over time they 
approach the level of action in male owned firms (Figure 12 left). By W4 there is no 
difference in the number of actions completed by (exclusively) male or female firms. Rather, 
the gender differences in venture creation over time may be attributed to those firms 
owned by mixed gender teams being more active, and increasingly so. Figure 12 (right) 
shows how activity on the Manufacturing industry increases more slowly than in other 
industries, despite no differences being evident between industries early on. 
Figure 12. 
  
0 10 20 30 40
Venture creation actions
Other
BusCons
Agriculture
Construct
Manuf
HealthSoc
ConsServ
Retail
excludes outside values
Total Venture Creation Actions Completed
 W1  W4
15
20
25
30
35
V
en
tu
re
 c
re
at
io
n 
ac
tio
ns
1 2 3 4
Wave
 Male  Female  Mixed
Venture Creation Actions over Time
15
20
25
30
35
V
en
tu
re
 c
re
at
io
n 
ac
tio
ns
1 2 3 4
Wave
 Retail  Manufacturing  Other
Venture Creation Actions over Time
Business Creation in Australia #7: Venture creation process 
16 
As is the case for the time during venture creation, the amount invested is what 
drives the process forward. For example Figure 13 shows the difference in the number of 
venture creation actions completed during each (annual) wave of the CAUSEE study, by 
comparing those firms that do and those that do not have a university educated founder 
amongst their owners. 
 
Figure 13. 
 
6.1 Action and time – process dynamics 
In addition to accounting for the total level of action a venture creation process 
contains, it is useful to normalise this by the time taken for the process to complete. In this 
case, what will separate different processes is not only the magnitude of their action but 
also the rate by which they make progress. The simplest type of dynamic measure is the 
number of actions completed per month. Another useful measure of venture creation 
dynamics is to calculate how this rate of activity changes over the process. For example, the 
timing of the bulk of venture creation action may come towards the start of the process 
(early timing), and proceed with decreasing intensity as it progresses. Alternatively, the level 
of activity could increase as the process plays out with more actions grouping toward the 
end of the process (late timing). 
The importance of combining action and time to derive dynamic properties for the 
venture creation process is highlighted when industry differences are analysed. For 
example, analyses presented earlier in this paper identified that venture creation processes 
in the Retail industry were not statistically different from other industries in terms of their 
duration (Figure 4) or the overall number of actions required (Figure 11). However when 
these two dimensions of the process are combined, some differences emerge. As it turns 
out, venture creation in the Retail industry proceeds at a higher rate of action than do 
processes in other industries. Further the timing of venture creation action in the Retail 
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industry tends to occur earlier on than in other industries. This means that venture creation 
processes for Retail Firms are often undertaken with early intensity, and given they do not 
have a markedly shorter duration overall, tapers off as the process proceeds. The 
impression here is that the industry demands this behavioural response from those 
entrepreneurs that choose to participate in it, given the lower barriers to entry and 
increased competition. Firms in the Agriculture industry exhibit a rather slower rate of 
venture creation action, despite being no less active overall. This suggests that Agriculture 
demands less intense action from firms that participate in this industry, or that making 
progress is harder to achieve any faster. 
6.2 Types of venture creation actions 
Using factor analysis, individual venture creation activities were grouped together 
by those that are more likely to occur jointly in the practice of venture creation. This 
method reveals underlying patterns that are driven ground-up by the empirical data 
themselves. Of the 35 activities, 91 per cent of the variation is explained by three separate 
factors which group together 30 actions as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Factor 1: Regulation Factor 2: Technology & plan Factor 3: Info & exchange 
Registered business name Signed ownership agreement Began product development 
Established legal form Developed prop. technology Began marketing 
Leased equipment / facilities Applied for IP protection Purchased materials /inventory 
Purchased liability insurance Collected competitor info Began customer discussions 
Registered business number (ABN) Defined market opportunities Joined online community 
Registered for GST Produced financial projections Joined business network 
Registered for payroll tax (PAYG) Developing business plan Took business classes 
Established supplier credit Sought outside funding Made business contactable 
Began regular (full-time) work Retained a lawyer  
Hired employee Created business website  
Opened business bank account   
Retained an accountant   
 
What this means is that should any action within a group be completed it is likely 
that others within this same factor group are also completed. The remaining five venture 
creation activities (deciding a business location, determining regulation requirements, 
investing money, joining a trade association, or gaining government assistance) available in 
the CAUSEE data do not associate particularly strongly with any one of these three groups. 
The validity of these grouping of activities is assessed by whether or not it makes practical 
sense that they co-occur. 
Factor Grouping  
Looking at these factor groupings more closely shows that they indeed make some 
sense. The first factor groups together activities that address the legal and procedural 
activities a new firm must engage in order to establish itself. This includes actions like 
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registering the business, setting a legal form, meeting various other regulatory 
requirements, purchasing insurance, opening accounts and engaging an accountant.  
The second factor groups together actions that define the venture technology and 
sophistication as well as venture planning. For example: collecting competitor information, 
defining market opportunities and producing financial projections address the new firm 
concept, and actions like developing proprietary technology and IP protection application 
address the sophistication of that firm.  
The third factor groups together actions that link the firm with its intended market 
and facilitate information exchange: beginning marketing and customer discussions; joining 
an online business community or a face to face business network; or making the business 
publicly contactable. 
Figure 14 shows the prevalence of each individual venture creation actions (as in 
Table 1) grouped into the factors described above. Further, this figure compares the use of 
these actions by different sub-groups in the CAUSEE sample for whom their usage is more 
pronounced. Before discussing some of the detail of the sub-group differences in individual 
actions, we first look at the factor group level comparisons. In line with the finding reported 
above, those founder teams that have prior experience of entrepreneurship are more likely 
more active overall. Therefore experienced teams have higher completion rates for each of 
the three factors, than do novice founders (for example Figure 14 bottom). 
The firms of all female founding teams are less likely to complete actions in the first 
and second factor groups. Team based ventures and those started by experienced founders 
are more likely to complete actions from these two factor groups (1 and 2). Teams that have 
at least one owner who holds a university degree are more likely to complete actions from 
the second factor grouping, while experienced entrepreneurs complete more actions that 
fall into the third factor group. Perhaps the most interesting pattern of sub-group difference 
is between product and service based firms. In this case service firms are more likely to 
complete actions from group one (regulation and formalization), while product firms are 
more likely to complete actions from group two (sophistication and planning). 
The pattern for female firms is most likely explained by their tendency to engage in 
less actions during the venture creation process overall, and in particular those activities 
associated with venture sophistication (factor 2). The opposite is true for experienced 
founders who are more active during venture creation in general, and this has them 
performing more actions from all three of the factor groups. This suggests that they are 
more likely to attempt more sophisticated ventures (factor 2), to engage more actively in 
networks and markets (factor 3), and actively comply with business regulation and 
establishment activities (factor 1).  
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Figure 14. 
 
 
 
Team based firms are similarly more active in general, and perform significantly 
more actions from group one (regulation and formalization) and two (sophistication and 
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planning). However, team based firms do not exhibit increased engagement of action from 
group three (information and exchange). This factor grouping contains networking activities 
like joining an online business community or a face to face business network. A plausible 
hypothesis for team based firms being less likely to act on these type of activities is that 
they are able to engage in such information exchange opportunities within the boundaries 
of their own firm. 
For university educated founding teams, their tendency for increased venture 
ambition and in turn increased venture sophistication, is highlighted by their engaging in 
more activities from factor two. Finally, if the nature of the activities from the first 
(regulation and formalization) and second (sophistication and planning) factor groups are 
compared, it is also plausible that they discriminate between product and service based 
firms. Product based firms are more likely to claim increased technical sophistication and 
seek outside funding as compared with service firms. Service based firms conceivably have 
an increased need for complying with regulation and legal formalization by engaging in 
activities such as purchasing liability insurance. 
6.3 Types of action and time – process sequences 
A number of previous attempts have been made by researchers to group  similar 
venture creation activities using similar data derived from samples of nascent start-ups. 
However, when this data is interpreted there is significant inconsistency between samples. 
This is due to the significant heterogeneity in any random sample of start-ups. When you 
add in the large number of possible individual behaviours and combinations of behaviours, 
the variation becomes increasingly difficult to synthesize. What this means is that if another 
selection of firms was assessed, the pattern of how their actions group together may be 
quite different to the one in this paper. This would be no less correct, however, just a 
different empirical example of venture creation at play. So we address this by using some 
theoretical perspective to group together action into that make conceptual sense, prior to 
analysing them based on real world data. 
In the remainder of this paper we group together conceptually similar types of 
venture creation actions, classified using theory rather than the data. The way we do this is 
to use a general theory of entrepreneurship based on the contrast between opportunity 
discovery and opportunity exploitation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2012). 
Discovery consists of the behaviours that describe the initial recognition, and elaboration of 
a venture idea. Therefore discovery relates to the conceptual side of venture creation. 
Exploitation is a separate type of behaviour “to gather and recombine the resources 
necessary to pursue an opportunity, as opposed to the mental activities” (Eckhardt & Shane, 
2010: 62). Therefore exploitation encompasses the actions taken to bring the business 
concept into being. 
The full list of thirty actions that were used to capture discovery and exploitation 
are listed in Table 2. Nine of these actions are related to the discovery side of venture 
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creation and focus solely on the conceptual aspects. Specifically, these actions dealt with 
planning and projecting future information; and venture concept development. The 
remaining twenty-one actions were more directed and concrete actions that set about 
enacting the venture, thus they capture exploitation behaviour. Here, exploitation type 
actions involve specific interactions with the market, the gathering of physical and financial 
resources. 
Table 2 
Discovery (Disc) Exploitation (Expl) 
Started thinking about business Registered business name Registered for payroll tax 
Began product development Decided location for business Sought outside funding 
Developed proprietary technology Established legal form Established supplier credit 
Commenced customer discussions Signed ownership agreement Hired employee 
Collected competitor information Began marketing Opened business bank account 
Defined market opportunities Applied for IP protection Invested own money 
Produced financial projections Leased equipment / facilities Retained an accountant 
Assessed regulatory requirements Purchased materials /inventory Retained a lawyer 
Began developing business plan Purchased liability insurance Made business contactable 
  Registered business number Created business website 
  Registered for GST   
 
If we compare this theoretical classification of actions to Table 1 there are some 
similarities. For example the previous factor one (regulation and formalization) is mainly an 
exploitation type behaviour, to put it in theoretical terms. On the other hand factor two 
consists mainly of discovery type actions as it deals with the conceptual qualities of the 
venture. 
The simplest analysis that might be conducted using discovery and exploitation 
groups of actions is to evaluate whether there are differences in the level of action applied 
to each of them by different sub-groups of ventures. Indeed this is the case. For example 
Manufacturing based firms are less likely to engage in discovery. Of course as we have seen 
Manufacturing firms are less active overall, at least in the time frame of the CAUSEE study. 
However, given that discovery type actions tend to happen early in a venture creation 
process, this finding may still hold some weight. On the other hand, firms in the Business 
Consulting industry tend to devote more effort to discovery type actions than is the norm. 
For the most part other sub-group breakdowns of discovery and exploitation reveal 
patterns of increased activity across both forms of action that may be attributed to these 
groups being more active over all. Female firms engage less in discovery and exploitation, 
but are also less active overall. Similarly university educated, experienced and team based 
ventures are more active overall, as well as in both type of discovery and exploitation 
action. One sub-group does diverge from this. Product based firms, while they are also more 
active in general, have a marginal bias in emphasis of action towards discovery. 
The summation that might be made of this analysis is that discovery and 
exploitation breakdowns for action tell us little more than we already know. That is, some 
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firms are more active than others. However, by using discovery and exploitation theory, and 
analysing groupings of like action, more complex analyses may be made that reveal patterns 
not related to the ‘level of action’ alone. 
Using the classification of different venture creation actions into theoretically 
derived types (discovery and exploitation) allows the assessment of patterns of temporal 
order to be conducted. Quite simply this means it is possible to tell if discovery activity is 
more likely to happen prior to exploitation activity, as the theory suggests. In addition it 
allows us to make assessments of whether similar types of Nascent Firms follow sequence 
patterns that are also alike. Using the venture creation action information available in 
CAUSEE as well as data on when each action happened (to the nearest month) it was 
possible to construct timelines of the 30 discovery or exploitation actions placed in order. 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Explanation 
Figure 15 presents this discovery-exploitation sequence information for all venture 
creation attempts in the CAUSEE study. This type of graph is likely to be unfamiliar to many 
readers, so a few words of explanation are necessary. Along the x-axis or time axis are the 
30 possible steps (from the actions listed in Table 2) and the colour signifies whether they 
were either: a) Discovery (Disc) action shown in dark gray; b) Exploitation (Expl) action 
shown in light gray or; c) One or more actions (DiEx) that combine discovery and 
exploitation at the same time (shown in medium gray). The y-axis shows the proportion of 
each type of action Disc / DiEx / Expl likely at each of the thirty possible steps. For example 
we can see that the first step in a venture creation sequence is most likely a discovery 
action, while the thirtieth is an exploitation action. 
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What Figure 15 shows is that the overall pattern that venture creation sequences 
follow are as the theory suggests, with discovery more likely to occur prior to exploitation.. 
Of the 625 venture creation sequences analysed in the CAUSEE sample only 7 sequence 
patterns are ever repeated. This means that 97 per cent of the venture creation sequences 
sampled follow their own unique trajectory. Because the venture creation process is unique 
to each firm sequences are examined in clusters rather than individual actions.   
Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 reveals clusters of venture creation sequences that share common 
characteristics to the order of actions taken. This typology was generated using sequence 
analysis techniques (Abbott, 1995) to break down the overall pattern (Figure 15) into 
different sub-types so that useful comparisons may be made between sub-groups of 
venture type. 
Sequence Type 1 
Sequence type one gathers together venture creation processes that are less active 
overall, and less likely to include episodes of simultaneous discovery and exploitation (DiEx). 
In particular, ventures which have a pattern like this sequence type will have an increased 
probability of early discovery action (Disc); and that discovery action is sustained for longer 
than any of the other three sequence types. The remaining three sequence types are more 
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likely to have an increased level of action overall. What distinguishes between these three 
sequences is the probability, timing, and order, or each of the different actions types (Disc, 
DiEx, Expl). Experienced and team based firms are similarly unlikely to proceed with a 
venture creation process that looks like sequence type one, as they are more inclined to 
proceed as those sequences of type four. 
Sequence Type 2  
Sequence type two seems to fall somewhere in between sequence type three and 
four. For this sequence early discovery is again pronounced, as is late exploitation, with the 
intervening part of the process balancing simultaneous discovery and exploitation. 
Sequences of type two are more likely to have transitions from simultaneous discovery-
exploitation into exploitation (DiEx > Expl) than other sequence types. Information on the 
sequence order by which venture creation plays out can reveal patterns in the data that 
escape simple analyses of how active Nascent Firms of various types may be (as above), or 
how long their process takes. For example, venture creation processes undertaken by team 
based firms or those who draw on prior entrepreneurial experience are equally likely to be 
more active overall than the norm. However these subgroups have different orders by 
which they make progress during venture creation (Figure 17 top right c.f. bottom left).  
Sequence Type 3  
Comparing sequence types two and three reveals some differences between the 
venture creation sequences preferred by these team firms and experienced firms. While 
both team and experienced ventures are more likely to follow sequence type three than are 
solo or first time ventures, that preference is far more strongly associated with experience 
than team status. On the other hand, sequence type two is preferred by solo firms, as well 
as experienced founders. When it comes to gender break down, mixed gender teams like 
experienced and team firms prefer sequence types three and four, while firms with male 
founder prefer sequence types two and three, and females sequence type one. The pattern 
of sequence preference in teams that have university educated founders is less clear, as 
each sequence type seems to have a sizeable proportion of their preference distribution. 
Sequence Type 4  
Sequence type four is characterised by discovery actions only very early in the 
process, and then switches, almost exclusively, to a pattern of simultaneous discovery and 
exploitation action for the remainder of the process. This is only interrupted when unique 
exploitation actions take precedence late in the process. In contrast, sequence type three 
has a higher probability of discovery early3 and which switches to simultaneous discovery 
and exploitation for a brief period before having an extended period of exploitation action 
from mid process onwards. This type of sequence is more likely than others to contain 
transitions from discovery directly into exploitation (Disc > Expl).  
                                                     
3 As well as late in the process: However, this late discovery signal is likely due the reduced number of long sequences. Therefore the 
seeming over representation of discovery may be due to a handful of cases, as the reliability of distribution estimates falls off with 
sequence length. None the less, these cases did pursue discovery late in the process, which goes to illustrate the wide variety of patterns 
possible, and indeed the wide variety of actual sequence patterns. 
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Figure 17. 
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Action-to-Action Transitions  
A final way in which the venture creation process can vary in complexity is the 
transitions between from one type of action to another. If we accept the theory that 
venture creation generally flows from discovery type action toward exploitation type action, 
as the empirical evidence supports (Figure 15), then the process could be considered to be 
directional. While there may be times where venture creation process can iterate from 
exploitation into discovery, for example should some learning happen that drives the firm to 
reconsider or adapt their venture idea, this would be a deviation from the overall direction. 
Effectuation is one such theory of entrepreneurship that encompasses this type of iterative 
behaviour (Sarasvathy, 2001). Effectuation theory suggests that entrepreneurs begin with 
what they know and make progress by undertaking incremental adaptations that minimise 
their propensity to make losses. The alternate view to effectuation is causation which begins 
with a goal toward which an entrepreneur forges ahead with their business goal and aims at 
maximizing profit. Further, effectuation type decisions are considered to be the domain of 
more experienced entrepreneurs. The CAUSEE data in part supports this notion with 
ventures founded by experienced entrepreneurs marginally more likely to contain 
backwards transitions from exploitation into discovery, as well as forward transitions from 
discovery into exploitation. In other words experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to 
cycle iteratively through discovery and exploitation actions during venture creation. Figure 
18 shows that there are some gender differences to this iterative behaviour. Female owned 
firms are more likely than other to stick to the copy-book forwards process that flows 
exclusively from discovery toward exploitation. On the other hand those firms founded by 
all male and mixed gender teams are more likely to include periods where they reconsider 
their venture, with transitions from exploitation back into discovery more likely in this case. 
Figure 18. 
 
  
0
2
4
6
V
en
tu
re
 c
re
at
io
n 
ac
tio
n 
tra
ns
iti
on
s
Male Female Mixed
excludes outside values
Venture Creation Sequence Direction
 Forward  Backward
Discovery to Exploitation
Business Creation in Australia #7: Venture creation process 
27 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described a number of aspects of the venture creation process. Despite 
the complexity of this phenomenon there are some common characteristics shared across 
different types of firms in how they plan, the time they take to build a new venture, the 
effort they invest, the actions they take, and the dynamic properties of how and when they 
act such as the order in which they do things. The following bullet points draw together 
some of the key findings in regards to these aspects of the venture creation process 
 
• Planning 
o Business planning is more prevalent in Nascent Firms in the process of being 
established than it is for Young Firms that have already established themselves. 
o Business planning is more strongly associated with firms that are more 
ambitious, being built by teams, draw on more experience or education. 
o While the prevalence of planning increases over time, the importance afforded 
to it falls over time. This divergence may explain the accompanying drift from 
more formal forms of business planning as time goes on. 
o First and foremost business planning is used as a thinking tool within the 
boundaries of the firm. 
• Time 
o There is no clear difference between how long it takes a firm to become 
operational compared with how long failed attempts are persisted with. 
o Industry characteristics in part drive the duration required for venture creation. 
Manufacturing and Agriculture based firms seemingly take longer timeframes 
than other industries. Extended venture creation time frames are also associated 
with firms that aim to bring more novel concepts to market. 
o Surprisingly, experienced entrepreneurs take more time rather than less time in 
the venture creation process. This is in part due to the increased ambitions they 
aspire too, but also a measure of the tenacity they display in pursuing their goal. 
• Effort 
o The effort invested in venture creation increases as the process proceeds. 
However, firms that are being built by university educated, teams of mixed 
gender, or experienced entrepreneurs increase their effort at a greater rate than 
do other groups. 
o Part-time entry into entrepreneurship is rather the norm than the exception. 
o Firms in the manufacturing industry have any increased tendency to be engaged 
in part-time, and also an increased tendency to be owned by founders who have 
other business interests in play. 
o Ownership changes during venture creation are not very common. However in 
spousal founder teams they are more common than others. 
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• Action 
o Overall firms that tend to be more active during venture creation are those that 
are more able to draw on human and social capital resources such as education, 
experience, and other founder team members to drive their attempt forward. 
o There are some patterns to the actions Nascent Firms engage in as they create a 
new venture. The CAUSEE data reveals that three different types of action tend 
to be associated with each other. The first describes regulation and business 
formalization actions, the second group of actions relates to the technological 
sophistication and planning in new ventures, the third group of actions deals 
with information, networking and exchange activities. 
o Experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in the networking, 
information and exchange type of activities than are novice entrepreneurs. 
University educated founding teams are more likely to engage in actions related 
to sophistication and planning, as are product based firms. However service 
based firms tend to engage in more regulation actions. 
• Dynamics 
o Although they do not take any less or more time, firms in the Retail industry tend 
to be engaged in at a higher rate of action, and at greater intensity early on in 
the process than do firms in other industries. 
• Sequences 
o The overall pattern of venture creation is from discovery type actions towards 
exploitation type actions. This direction tends to drive the process from concepts 
towards actions. 
o Separate from the amount of action engaged in by Nascent Firms, the order in 
which they act can vary between different sub-groups. With more experienced 
entrepreneurs prepared to engage in discovery and exploitation actions at the 
same time. 
o Experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to follow an iterative sequence of 
venture creation that includes loops of action from exploitation back into more 
discovery actions. This suggests they use the venture creation process in order to 
learn about their environment. 
In summary, while environmental factors may describe differences in the venture 
creation process required by Nascent Firms, such as the industry of the firm, the most 
influential aspects that drive how venture creation plays out are related to the 
characteristics of the firm founders, such as their stock of human and social capital. These 
aspects are ones that are in the entrepreneur’s control to enhance. This means that 
successful venture creation processes are more likely driven by the actions entrepreneurs 
take than by the constraints imposed on them. 
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APPENDIX 
About CAUSEE 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) is a 
research program that aims to uncover the factors that initiate, hinder and facilitate the 
process of creation of new businesses in Australia. CAUSEE employs and extends in the 
Australian context the approach to studying ‘nascent entrepreneurs’ and ‘firms in gestation’ 
that was first developed for the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) (Gartner, 
Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004) and is partly harmonised with the PSED II study 
undertaken in the US 2005-2010 (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). The CAUSEE data collection was 
funded by the Australian Research Council with contributions also from industry partners 
BDO and National Australia Bank. More comprehensive accounts of the CAUSEE data 
collection can be found in (Davidsson et al., 2011) and in the CAUSEE user manual 
(Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, 2012). 
The major purpose of the research is to identify representative samples of on-going 
venture start-up efforts and follow their development over time. This approach addresses 
the under coverage of, and/or sparseness of data about the smallest and youngest entities 
that typically signify available business data bases. It also overcomes the selection bias 
resulting from including only start-up efforts that actually resulted in up-and-running 
businesses. Further, the approach largely overcomes hindsight bias and memory 
decay 4resulting from asking survey questions about the start-up process retrospectively, 
and gets the temporal order of assessment right for cause-and-effect analysis. 
The primary data set for CAUSEE comprises of random samples of Nascent firms (N 
= 625) and Young firms (N = 559). While the main level of analysis in CAUSEE is the 
(emerging) venture or firm, sampling necessarily starts with the individuals behind the start-
ups. Thus, the samples were obtained by screening adults in 30,105 randomly sampled 
households. Qualified individuals were retained as the sole spokesperson on behalf of the 
firm whether or not it had additional owners; however questions were asked about the 
contributions of all owners.  
In order to qualify in the Nascent firm category, the respondent had to report 
concrete (and continuing) actions towards starting a new business within the past 12 
months, be a part owner of this business, and not yet having experienced a period where 
revenues exceeded costs for at least 6 of the past 12 months. In the latter case, the 
respondent was instead included in the Young firms category provided the firm had not 
been operational for more than four years. Among the non-eligible cases every 50th 
respondent was selected for inclusion in a Control Group (n=506) to allow for basic socio-
demographic comparisons between business founders and the general population. The 
Control Group was not followed over time. 
                                                     
4 Hindsight bias refers to the tendency for people to re-interpret past events based on current circumstances and this can bias 
retrospective research. Memory decay refers to the fact that events further in the past are more difficult to recall, and this effect can bias 
research which requires the recollection of the past. 
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Supplementary, non-random samples of “High Potential” Nascent firms (N = 102) 
and Young firms (N = 113) were also generated. These cases were sourced from a broad 
array of individuals and organizations likely to be in contact with such start-ups at an early 
stage. Apart from the criteria described above the High Potential ventures had to reach a 
certain minimum score across criteria based on the education and experience of the 
founders, their aspirations for the venture, and its level of technological sophistication (it 
should be noted that a distinct minority of the random samples also meet these criteria).   
Eligible cases that agreed to participate proceeded through a 40-55 minute long 
telephone interview. They were subsequently re-contacted for follow-up interviews of 
approximately the same length every 12 months over three years. Hence, the data base 
consists of four waves of interviews undertaken in 2007/8 to 2010/11. In each wave, about 
85 per cent of eligible cases agreed to participate. The fact that some start-ups cease to 
operate during the study further reduces the number of cases over time. It may be noted 
that this affects more the Nascent firm category compared to Young firms. Therefore, the 
maximum numbers of cases available for analysis in each sample category and data 
collection wave are as follows. 
Table A1. CAUSEE samples and response rates across waves 
 Random 
sample 
Nascent 
Firms 
Random 
sample 
Young Firms 
High 
Potential 
Nascent 
Firms 
High 
Potential 
Young Firms 
Non-
entrepreneur 
Control 
Group 
Wave 1 625 559 106 120 506 
Wave 2 493 472 91 98 n/a 
Wave 3 281 353 71 81 n/a 
Wave 4 183 263 59 64 n/a 
 
The design allows for two types of analyses of development over time. First, 
individual cases can be followed across the waves of data collection, i.e., for a maximum of 
three years. Second, comparisons between Nascent firms and Young firms also indicate 
development over time, extending the total window through which the study captures start-
up processes to at least 6-7 years. However, the latter type of comparison must be 
interpreted with caution as it confounds changes in the composition of different start-up 
populations (cohorts) over time at the first point of entry, and what happens over time to 
the members of a given cohort.  
In each wave of data collection a large amount of information was collected about 
the characteristics of the venture; the resources available to or invested in it; its strategies, 
actions and aspirations, and the outcomes it had achieved. When a venture had been 
terminated an ‘exit interview’ was performed and the case was dropped from subsequent 
waves. Different reports in this series will focus on different parts of these contents, and to 
some degree on different sub-samples.  
